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Donald Walker has provided us with a three-volume collection of work drawn from the 
literature of the past half-century intended to illustrate the variations over that period in the form 
and substance of the economist’s concept of “equilibrium” and, in so doing, to complement the 
well-known Debreu collection on General Equilibrium Theory.  Like all such projects, this 
collection, through the act of inclusion (and, hence, exclusion), serves to delineate for the non-
specialist the range of the relevant questions, to identify points of controversy, and, by the 
ordering of the selected items, to reveal lines of intellectual development that otherwise might be 
obscured.  Although this collection takes for its theme the question of equilibrium in all its 
dimensions, Walker’s earlier broadside against contemporary general equilibrium literature in 
the Arrow-Debreu tradition looms over these volumes from start to finish.  That is unfortunate 
since Walker’s standard of a “functioning model,” exhibiting “the highest possible degree of 
[institutional] realism” serves to obscure rather than to illuminate the long-standing 
methodological division between those, on the one hand, for whom the concept of equilibrium is 
no more than a “useful fiction” whose meaning is conditioned upon the model under 
consideration and those others for whom the concept expresses an observable feature of the 
world in which we live.  In this review essay, we develop an alternative organizational 
framework which permits us to more clearly reveal the methodological fault lines running 
through the literature sampled by Walker’s selections and thereby to identify the intellectual 
filiations between the objections raised by Blaug, McCloskey, and other recent critics and those 
advanced long ago by Keynes, Kaldor, Robinson, and Hicks. 
This essay is scheduled to appear in 2004 in Warren J. Samuels and Jeff E. Biddle, eds., 
Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. 
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I.  THE COLLECTION 
 
The three volumes before us comprise the second title in the “Elgar Reference Collection” 
of Critical Ideas in Economics, a new series which, we learn from the book cover, aims to 
provide “an essential reference source for students, researchers and lecturers in economics.”  
Each volume in the series will bring together a collection of previously-published articles and 
book-chapters which “focuses on [a] concept widely used in economics,” and will thereby 
“improve access to important areas of literature which will not be available in the archives of 
many of the newer libraries.”  No one can deny that Professor Walker’s topic is ideally suited to 
this stated intent; is there a concept more “widely used in economics” than that of equilibrium?  
A collection of previously-published items cannot, of course, be appraised in terms of the 
originality of its content.  Such a work offers a different sort of contribution.  In addition to the 
publisher’s stated aim of an improved access to those key articles which, either because of their 
age or the location of their publication, are not widely available, a work such as this can perform 
a function not unlike that which Weintraub (1991, pp. 129-30) ascribes to the survey article.  The 
act of selection (and, hence, of exclusion) serves to delineate the field for the non-specialist, and 
the ordering of the items in the collection can reveal instructive lines of intellectual 
development—a “filiation of scientific ideas” to adopt Schumpeter’s (1954, p. 6) felicitous 
phrase—that otherwise might be obscured.   2 
The value of the work before us is enhanced by its standing as a complement to the earlier 
Elgar collection on General Equilibrium Theory (Debreu, 1996).  In his introduction to that 
collection, Debreu identified several topics that had to be excluded from his volumes.  At least a 
half-dozen of those excluded topics—temporary equilibrium, fix-price models, rational 
expectations, overlapping generations, sunspot equilibria, and game theory—find representation in 
Walker’s collection.  Further, Walker has quite sensibly avoided reprinting items already included 
in that earlier collection and  has provided, at the end of his second and third volumes, lists of 
supplementary readings relevant to the topics treated in those volumes, noting in those lists the 
particular items available in the earlier, Debreu collection.  As to the ordering of the items and the 
matter of improved access, Walker’s strategy differs from that adopted by Debreu, permitting some 
improvement in the one case but perhaps not in the other.  The improvement comes in the broad 
topical categories governing the arrangement of the Walker selections.  No such topical ordering is 
found in the Debreu collection, which simply lists its entries alphabetically by first author’s 
surname.  To be sure, Walker’s arrangement is not beyond objection.  As we shall see, a few items 
are misclassified, and at least two interesting intellectual lines of descent are obscured by the 
chosen scheme.  Nevertheless, even if imperfect, the topical ordering provides the reader with what 
is at least a provisional frame of reference and is consequently a welcome improvement over the 
simple, alphabetical arrangement of the earlier, General Equilibrium collection.  It is that earlier 
collection, however, which apparently reflects a greater attention given to the availability of the 
potential entries.  At any rate, Debreu (1996, I, p. xii) tells us that he excluded from his volumes 
any items “published in the 1990s” on the principle that “papers written in the more distant past . . . 
are less readily available and critical judgement about them is less unreliable.”  Walker obviously 
did not apply the same rule.  Of the eighty-five items comprising the collection before us, forty-four 3 
appeared in the 1990s, sixteen of which appeared after 1995.  Still, the Walker collection manages 
to achieve a rather greater breadth of sources.  In both cases, the most frequently-cited source is 
Econometrica, but that journal provides only nine of Walker’s selections while, in keeping with its 
role in the history of general equilibrium theory (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, chap.  9; Weintraub, 
1983; II, 1)
 1, it provides thirty-five of the ninety items selected by Debreu. 
 
II.  GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND “REALISM” 
Although the title of this collection suggests a concern with the concept of equilibrium in all 
its dimensions, Walker’s (1997) earlier broadside against contemporary general equilibrium 
literature in the Arrow-Debreu tradition looms over these volumes from start to finish.  Indeed, 
chapters four and five of that critique are among the selections chosen for this collection.  
Stripped of the rather tiresome repetition, Walker’s criticism comes down to two fundamental 
points, both of which are embodied in his demand that an analytical model satisfy his standard of 
a “functioning system.”  This last is a concept that is central to the argument conveyed in the two 
chapters of that critique reproduced here (in Vol. II, items 5 and 17), but the reader will likely 
have some difficulty with those selections since the notion of a “functioning system” is defined 
and explained only in chapter one of that earlier work, which is not included in this collection.  
This problem is, of course, inevitable when an anthology includes selections drawn from a 
larger, integrated work.  Fortunately, that occurs only infrequently here, the chief instances being 
the Walker chapters and a selection from Fisher (1983, chap. 2; II, 20).  To be sure, the difficulty 
                                                 
 
1  When citing an item appearing in our collection, its location will be indicated by the relevant volume number (as 
Roman numeral) and chapter (Arabic notation).  Further, since the collection provides the included items in 
“facsimile reproduction, inclusive of footnotes and pagination to facilitate ease of reference,” I shall follow the 
publisher’s lead and indicate cited passages by the original pagination.   
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can be ameliorated by the addition of an essay introducing the selection or of an explanatory 
footnote at the relevant point; but, apart from the list of supplemental readings already mentioned 
and a brief, general essay introducing the collection as a whole at the opening of Volume I, these 
volumes, like those of the earlier, Debreu collection, offer no such scholarly appurtenances.   
Readers familiar with Walker’s complaints against the general equilibrium literature will 
recall his appeal to the notion of a “functioning system” as a standard of appraisal.  To meet that 
standard, the model specification must contain sufficient institutional detail to motivate and 
direct the behavior under investigation.  It must, in other words, identify the “physical structures, 
institutions, technology, laws, procedures, etc. . . . [that] condition, permit, or enforce ways of 
behaving on the part of the participants” (Walker, 1997, p. 9).  A model that fails to measure up 
is “incomplete” and therefore can tell us nothing useful about the economic reality that surrounds 
us.  Lest the reader fail to grasp the exacting nature of this standard, Walker (p. 35) lists 
explicitly the elements that must be included if a general equilibrium structure is to be deemed 
“complete” and, hence, a “functioning system”: 
The main purpose [of the chapter] has been to show that the general 
equilibrium models constructed in this century are not functioning systems 
because they are incomplete. . . .  
A model should contain firms, consumers, and resource suppliers, all 
with specified characteristics.  It should contain general economic 
institutions, by which is meant institutions other than those which are 
within markets; and it should contain technology, productive process, and 
systems of communication that link economic agents with markets.  The 
model should have markets with well-defined physical features that enable 
the participants to make purchases and sales, and with marketplace 
institutions, technology, rules, and pricing conventions and procedures.  
The model should specify concretely how the traders are enabled to come 
together, how prices are quoted and publicized in each particular market, 
how and when information about prices and sales in each particular market 
is transmitted to traders in other markets, by whom and how prices are 
changed, and how offers to buy and sell are made public. 5 
To be sure, general equilibrium theorists have long acknowledged a need to invest their 
models with at least the minimum institutional framework necessary to give structure to the 
posited behavior.  Here is the source of the infamous “auctioneer,” introduced to get round the 
awkward realization that a strict understanding of a competitive market as a case where “no one 
can affect the terms on which he may transact” seems to exclude all possible means by which 
such agents can find a set of prices at which the quantities offered for sale are just matched by 
the quantities demanded.  If the existing prices do not produce such a match and if no agent has 
the power to alter his offer price, what mechanism changes market prices in the direction of the 
supposed equilibrium?  The answer, of course, is the hypothetical market-maker, or “super-
auctioneer,” who is introduced strictly to perform this function (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, pp. 264-
6; see also Walker, 1997, pp. 13-25).  This august personage is able to collect information on the 
individual supply and demand offers at each price, calculate the price change necessary to move 
the market in the direction of equilibrium, then call out a new set of prices for a new round, 
thereby moving the market through a succession of converging steps to equilibrium, where all 
trades are conducted.  But even here the market-maker cannot rest:  he must also transmit to each 
of the participants information regarding the location and magnitude of all other individual 
supply and demand offers, thus enabling them to identify trading counterparts.  Even aficionados 
of this literature find the implied information burden borne by the auctioneer to be beyond the 
credible.  Arrow and Hahn (1971, pp. 266, 324) themselves characterize their market-maker as 
no more than an “extremely artificial,” “as if” simplification.  Those who find the “as if” 
expedient unsatisfactory will, no doubt, agree with Walker’s (1997, p. 22) conclusion that “the 
process is obviously absurd.”  Hence, it is not surprising that Walker should insist, as a second 
condition defining his notion of a “functioning system,” that the specified institutional structure 6 
have a clearly recognizable congruence with the reality to be understood:  “The objective of 
models that are intended to explain the real economy should be to achieve the highest possible 
degree of realism regarding the phenomena and relations that are deemed important” (Walker, 
1997, pp. 38-9).  All this, then, is the necessary background to the bipartite complaint we 
encounter in the first of the earlier Walker chapters reproduced in this collection.  There we learn 
that the general equilibrium literature exhibits two distinct flaws:  “One problem,” with these 
studies “is that . . . their postulates have no justifications provided by foundations in a 
functioning model,” and the “second problem is that the postulates and the process of 
manipulating the equations have no contact with real economic conditions” (Walker, 1997, pp. 
101-2; II, 5).   
We see these earlier complaints reflected in the two, overlapping classification schemes 
advanced in Walker’s introductory essay to these volumes.  The first of these draws upon an 
inference regarding the investigator’s methodological stance.  Under this head we have two 
classes of models.  The “first type is constructed on the presumption that the real economy is an 
equilibrating system because it does not exhibit much instability.”  In the “second type of 
model,” however, “equilibrium is not deliberately created.”  Instead, “the procedure is to 
incorporate assumptions into a model which are believed to be accurate representations of 
properties of the real economy, and the object is to see whether or not the model is an 
equilibrating system” in the hope that one can then draw a judgment “about whether or not a 
position of equilibrium exists in the real economy” (I, pp. xiv-xv).  Overlying this distinction as 
to the methodological status of the equilibrium concept we find a second classification scheme 
reflecting Walker’s repeated complaint regarding the insufficient institutional “realism” of these 
models.  This class too is divided in two parts.  The first encompasses the “perfectly competitive 7 
virtual models”—that is, those which are “virtual in the sense that the only behavior that occurs 
in disequilibrium . . . is the quotation and changing of prices and the determination of the 
associated desired supply and demand quantities of the participants.”  Here are the constructions 
of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie type and those of their intellectual descendants.  Standing in 
contrast to these are the “non-virtual models,” those which  permit some form of “disequilibrium 
behavior other than just the changing of prices and the reporting of the associated supply and 
demand quantities . . . .”  These possess the merit that they “are closer to reality than the virtual 
variety,” and their extension “beyond perfect competition to a number of other types of situations 
that are found in the real economy” is a “further step in the right direction” (I,  pp. xviii-xx).  
Apparently, however, this ranking according to the degree of institutional “realism” offers little 
help in drawing instructive distinctions.  At any rate, Walker tells us that a “superabundance” of 
models “have little or no relation to real economic situations.”  They are no more than “toys, 
games of logic with their own internal problems and rules that derive not from contacts with the 
real economy but from the previous literature on the subject.”  Hence, it is of no consequence 
whether “[t]hey are endowed with equilibrating properties or are examined to determine the 
presence or absence of those features,” since any results obtained from these toy models “are not 
interesting from an economic point of view” (I, p. xv).   
Nevertheless, the question of institutional realism provides the framework for the papers 
collected in Volume II, about half of which is devoted to the treatment of “perfectly competitive 
virtual models.”  Within that class, the papers are arranged according to the three classical 
problems of general equilibrium theory: the “existence” of equilibrium (can the model at hand be 
shown to possess such an equilibrium), its “uniqueness” (can the model be shown to exhibit only 
one such equilibrium), and its (local and global) “stability” (see Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 360).  8 
The remainder of the volume is divided between “non-virtual purely competitive models” and 
the extension of the “non-virtual” class to “various forms of market imperfection.”  This 
classification by institutional realism is abandoned in Volume III, which, we are told, is simply 
intended to illustrate some of  the “many special concepts of equilibrium [that] have been 
developed recently” (I, p. xx), identifying, among others, “stationary,” “temporary,” “rational 
expectations,” Bayesian” equilibria, game theoretic equilibria (the longest section, containing 
fourteen items), and, finally, a catch-all, “other” category.  Finally, Volume I provides the 
introduction to this theoretical work with a series of papers ostensibly devoted to “historical 
perspectives,” to “criticisms of the equilibrium concept,” and to investigations of the “meaning 
an concepts of modern economic equilibrium theory.”
2 
 
III.  THE MANY FACES OF EQUILIBRIUM 
A.  “Positivists” vs. “Pragmatists” 
The reader comes away from this jumble yearning for a sense of coherence.  The nature and 
content of the notion conveyed by the term “equilibrium” vary widely throughout these volumes.  
Walker’s preoccupation with the acknowledged lack of institutional detail in these models fails 
to satisfy our desire for a framework that can help us to form these differing conceptions into an 
                                                 
2  The attentive reader will notice the curious omission from this litany of any mention of applications of 
computational general equilibrium models to various historical and contemporary policy questions, an omission 
that is remarked as well by the reviewer of Walker’s Advances in General Equilibrium Theory (Hoass, 2000).  
Walker could reply that such applications have frequently provoked the same criticism he raises here—namely the 
objection that they fail to capture the relevant empirical relationships.  For an illustration of a recent application in 
a historical context and the associated criticism, see Harley and Crafts (2000) and Temin (2000).  Nevertheless, 
such models have found extensive use in the evaluation of trade policy (Srinivasan and Whalley, 1986), and one 
such paper does, indeed, find its way into Walker’ collection, though it is “mislaid” in the section devoted to 
“market imperfection” (Mercenier, 1995; II, 25).  As we will see below, this is not the only case of 
misclassification.  The contribution of Mercenier’s paper is not its incorporation of imperfect information and 
scale economies, which have been abiding themes in trade applications; it is rather his warning that trade 
economists err in their long-standing assumption that “nonuniqueness is largely a theoretical curiosum” (p. 162).  
Mercenier obtains, with a calibration of his model to EEC data, two plausible but wildly divergent equilibrium 
outcomes arising from the policy experiment under investigation. 
     9 
orderly structure and thereby to reveal the lines of thematic progression running through this 
literature.  We do, however, find a hint as to where we might look for such a framework in 
Walker’s passing observation that each of the “specific concepts of equilibrium” treated in his 
third volume is model-specific, quoting for illustration Milgate’s earlier lament that equilibrium 
has “become a category with no meaning independent of the exact specification of the initial 
conditions for any model” (Milgate, 1987, p. 182; emphasis in original; quoted in I, p. xx).  This 
calls to mind Weintraub’s recent efforts to remind us of the growing realization among 
philosophers and sociologists of science that “scientific work is knowledge creation in a context 
and that such knowledge is shared knowledge within a particular community” (Weintraub, 1991, 
p. 4).  Viewed from this perspective, the concept of equilibrium derives its meaning strictly from 
the theoretical context in which it is employed by the scientific community, that meaning 
changing with that context.  As Weintraub puts the point, this approach “maintains that there is 
no meaning of ‘equilibrium’ except as that word is used by the community of economists who 
read and write texts in which the word ‘equilibrium’ appears; the meaning of ‘equilibrium’ is 
derived from the use to which the word is put by the community of readers of texts on 
equilibrium analysis.”  Or, more bluntly, “equilibrium is a feature of our models, not the world.”  
This view, which Weintraub designates as that of “the pragmatist,” stands in opposition to that of 
the “positivist,” who “argues that the idea of equilibrium is associated with some aspect of the 
real world and that the task in the scientific analysis of competitive equilibrium is to create 
better, or more realistic, models of equilibrium; the test of the theory of equilibrium is thus . . . 
correspondence with the real world in which equilibrium is to be found” (Weintraub, 1991, pp. 
107-109). 10 
Viewed through the prism of this distinction between the “positivist” and the “pragmatist,” 
the epistemological fault lines running through this collection become strikingly apparent.  The 
positivists are, of course, well represented by Walker’s repeated call for “the highest possible 
degree of realism” in economic modeling, but his is not a lone voice.  We have also Kaldor’s 
powerful lament that general equilibrium theory of the Arrow-Debreu type is not only “barren 
and irrelevant as an apparatus of thought to deal with the manner of operation of economic 
forces,” but, worse, because of “the powerful attraction of the habits of thought engendered by 
‘equilibrium economics,’ [it] has become a major obstacle to the development of economics as a 
science—meaning by the term ‘science’ a body of theorems based on assumptions that are 
empirically derived (from observations) and which embody hypotheses that are capable of 
verification both in regard to the assumptions and the predictions.”  Consequently, by Kaldor’s 
standard, which seeks the conversion of general equilibrium theory “into a set of theorems 
directly related to observable phenomena, the development of theoretical economics was one of 
continual degress, not progress.”   But Kaldor’s complaint is not limited to the self-consciously 
axiomatic nature of general equilibrium theory.  On the contrary, he calls into question the very 
notion of equilibrium itself.  Here we encounter, in a particularly strong form, a theme which 
recurs frequently in the critical and evaluative papers reproduced in Volume I—namely, the 
realization that the dynamic process of adjustment necessarily involves continuous changes in 
wealth positions and in the structure of markets, firms, and other institutions as well, all of which 
alter the nature of the model’s equilibrium, thereby making it all the more uncertain that any 
such “point of rest” will ever be achieved.  The particular form of this path-dependence problem 
that troubles Kaldor is that which arises when we acknowledge a widespread existence of scale 
economies:  “When every change in the use of resources—every reorganization of productive 11 
activities—creates the opportunity for a further change which would not have existed otherwise, 
the notion of an ‘optimum’ allocation of resources . . . becomes a meaningless and contradictory 
notion.”  Fortunately for our classroom exercises, Kaldor is willing to grant an exception for a 
narrow range of comparative statics applications:  the concept of an “optimal” allocation of 
resources “falls apart—except perhaps for the consideration of short-run problems, where the 
framework of social organization and the distribution of the major part of available ‘resources,’ 
such as durable equipment and trained or educated labour, can be treated as given as a heritage of 
the past, and the effects of current decisions on future development are ignored” (Kaldor, 1972, 
pp. 1237-39; 1245-46; I, 7; emphasis in original).  On this point, Kaldor seems to carry the 
objection further even than Walker, who, while acknowledging in his introduction that “the 
structure of the economy varies with parametric changes [which] will alter its equilibrium values 
and its equilibrating properties,” nevertheless insists that “this does not obviate the value of 
equilibrium analysis” so long as we can “expect the revision of a model in order to reflect the 
structural and behavioral changes that are seen to result from a change of conditions” (I, p. xvii).  
No one, however, carries the criticism of equilibrium further than John Henry, who, in an essay 
that would have been better positioned in the section devoted to “criticisms of the equilibrium 
concept” than in its current grouping with papers exploring the “meaning and concepts” of 
equilibrium theory, nevertheless delivers the ultimate positivist critique:  “unless equilibrium 
itself can be proved to be an actual state of society, the argument is hollow” (Henry, 1983-84, 
220; I, 22; emphasis in original).       
Weintraub’s “pragmatists” would have little patience with such a demand, and theirs is 
unmistakably the majority view among the papers collected here.  Though written nearly a half-
century ago, the best exemplar remains Machlup’s cogent expression of the equilibrium concept as 12 
“a mental tool” to aid “in establishing to our satisfaction a causal nexus between different events or 
changes” contemplated within the “mental experiments” of our models.  Long before Weintraub 
christened the position with the “pragmatist” label, Machlup ([1958] 1991, p. 53, n.7; I, 6) insisted 
that the equilibrium concept can be understood only within the context of the model under 
investigation, warning his reader that “equilibrium and disequilibrium refer to whatever model you 
may have in mind.”
3  Indeed, “to characterize a concrete situation ‘observed’ in reality as one of 
‘equilibrium,’” as Henry and, apparently, Walker demand as a necessary condition to the 
application of the concept, “is to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness”—a fallacy that 
arises when we find ourselves “forgetting the relativity of equilibrium with respect to variables and 
relations selected,” and consequently “jumping the distance between a useful fiction and particular 
data of observation” (pp. 57-8).  To make that leap raises the further danger of the “fallacy of 
implicit evaluation or disguised politics” (p. 60).  If we succumb to “the popular association of 
equilibrium with a Good Thing and of disequilibrium with a Bad Thing,” the concept becomes a 
tool of persuasion, employed to gain support for some policy stance.  It that event, we are left with 
“an equilibrium concept so drastically restricted by built-in political criteria [that it] becomes less 
useful, if not useless, in the analysis of most problems” (pp. 70-71).    
Machlup’s definition of equilibrium as a “mental tool” to aid in analysis is, of course, widely 
accepted, and it recurs frequently throughout these volumes.  Indeed, Dore reminds us that we 
heard its echo in Keynes’s stated goal to develop “an organized and orderly method of thinking out 
particular problems” (Keynes, [1936] 1964, p. 297; quoted in Dore, 1984-85, p. 194; I, 24).  We 
hear it too, more recently, in Caravale’s (1994, p. 28; I, 28) “logical conception” of equilibrating 
                                                 
3  Here again we have a case of apparent misclassification.  Machlup’s careful exposition “of the equilibrium concept 
. . . as a methodological device in abstract theory” (p. 44) is by no means a “criticism” of that concept, though the 
paper appears as the first entry in the section so titled.  It would be better placed in the “meaning and concepts” 
section. 
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adjustment as “a process  of potential convergence in the direction of the ‘center of gravity’ which 
can be identified on the basis of some fundamental data of the model.”  
B.  Alternative Structures:  Sraffian Surplus 
There is also ample illustration of that “relativity of equilibrium” which Machlup described 
so long ago and which Walker employs as the theme for the third of our volumes.  Instructive 
cases of this model-specific variation in the equilibrium concept occur in the earlier volumes as 
well, but the point is obscured by the classification scheme adopted.  We have, for example, at 
least two papers devoted to an examination of the concept of equilibrium employed in the 
Sraffian exposition of Classical theory—that is, the line of development that Blaug (1999, pp. 
214-15) has characterized as a “rational reconstruction” of Ricardo, though one “capable of 
affording a springboard for a wholly new style of long-run equilibrium theorizing . . . as an 
alternative heritage to the mainstream lineage of neoclassical economics.”  The two papers 
illustrating this “alternative heritage” appear in Volume I, though one (Harris, 1991; I, 4) is 
curiously located in the section promising “historical perspective,” and the second (Bharadwaj, 
1991; I, 13) appears nearly two hundred pages later near the end of the section devoted to 
“criticisms of the equilibrium concept.”
4  Bharadwaj’s is indeed a criticism of the neoclassical 
concept of equilibrium—one which takes as its point of departure Joan Robinson’s (1974; I, 8) 
influential objection to the “timelessness” of general equilibrium modeling.  The solution 
                                                 
4  The selection criteria employed to identify the papers comprising the “historical” section remains a mystery.  The 
section opens reasonably enough with the Arrow and Hahn (1971, chap. 1) “Historical Introduction,” and that is 
followed by an old survey of “Smith’s concept of Equilibrium” as it is expressed in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations (Myers, 1976).  From there, however, we leap to a rigorous investigation of 
the “cross-dual” adjustment process found in those general equilibrium studies where price adjustment is specified 
as a function of excess demands and quantity adjustments are modeled as a response to profit differentials 
(Flaschel and Semmler, 1987).  This is followed by the Harris paper on Sraffian equilibrium, after which the 
section closes with a return to a more obviously “historical” work, namely Magnan de Bornier’s (1992) careful 
reconstruction from the original texts of the substance of the “Cournot-Bertrand Debate” over the nature of 
duopoly behavior. 
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proposed by Bharadwaj is an appeal to the Sraffian approach, which, he insists, is to be preferred 
for its “ability fruitfully to combine historical elements abstracted from concrete observation and 
to bring them together in short chains of logical reasoning.”  The source of this superiority lies in 
the “central concept of classical theory,” which Bharadwaj identifies, in the Sraffian tradition, as 
the notion of a social surplus—roughly analogous to the nonlabor share of the net national 
product.  Because it must determine the extent of this surplus, “Classical political economy 
(CPE) . . . encompasses theories of the determination of wages, of methods of production, and of 
social demand,” but it is significant that “these magnitudes are not simultaneously and co-
terminously determined as a subproblem of relative price formation.”  For this reason, says 
Bharadwaj, “CPE has a much more dynamic story to tell about the interrelationships between 
levels and changes in output and wages, or between the changes in output and techniques, and 
vice versa.”  Indeed, “one of the important consequences” of this “surplus” structure is that 
“‘factor prices’ are not determined from within the same process and by the same mechanism as 
‘commodity prices,’” (Bharadwaj, 1991, pp. 81; 85-86; I, 13, emphasis in original).  This, of 
course, is a characteristic feature of the classical model, but Bharadwaj’s claims regarding a 
supposed greater “dynamic” scope in the Sraffian, “surplus” approach to that model  would carry 
more weight had he confronted the fundamental circularity that bedevils that approach.  Since 
the surplus is defined as the residual left after deducting from total output the wage bill of the 
labor employed in the production of that output, the magnitude of that total product must be 
known prior to the determination of the surplus.  Further, the rate of profit in this framework is 
defined as the ratio of that surplus to that wage bill.  Now, if the total product comprises more 
than one commodity, it must be expressed in value terms; but if the value coefficient is itself 
dependent upon the rate of profit, then to claim that the magnitude of the total product is 15 
determined prior to the rate of profit is to involve one in circular reasoning (see Garegnani, 
1987).  The problem can be resolved by taking one of the variables (usually the wage rate) as 
given exogenously, but Bharadwaj tells us nothing of the implications raised by these analytical 
difficulties for his claim of a greater opportunity within the surplus tradition for a more fruitful 
dynamic analysis.   
From Harris, on the other hand, we learn that those writing in the Walrasian tradition are not 
alone in their concerns regarding the stability characteristics of their equilibrium models.  Sraffa’s 
intellectual heirs have raised similar concerns.  In this tradition, “the appropriate and relevant 
equilibrium concept to consider is that of ‘long period equilibrium,’ . . . characterised by the 
existence of ‘prices of production’ at a uniform rate of profit on the supply price of capital, those 
prices being said to constitute a center of gravitation for ‘market prices.’”  However, if we 
presume that it is profit-rate differentials that drive firm output decisions, we find that such an 
adjustment mechanism “cannot be guaranteed to provide the correct signals to profit seeking firms 
in their investment and output decisions that would cause the set of all firms to act so as to bring 
into existence [the equilibrium] prices of production and corresponding profit rate.”  Hence, just 
as in the Walrasian tradition so also in the Sraffian approach, “what is at issue . . . is whether the 
idea of a convergence of market prices to production prices is sustainable under any economically 
meaningful description of capitalist behaviour as regards decisions on prices, output, and 
investment.”  Further, the Sraffian literature is no more scrupulous in its attention to the kind of 
institutional content whose omission from the Walrasian models Walker finds so distressing.  
Certainly we hear echo of Walker’s complaint in Harris’s objection that the “analytic solutions” 
obtained from the surplus models “are, in many cases, not susceptible to any economically 
meaningful interpretation,” because those models embody a “specification of economic behaviour 16 
and institutional structure [that] is seriously lacking in the very elements that are relevant to 
evaluating the dynamic behaviour of real-world economies.”  The particular missing elements 
identified by Harris reproduce almost exactly Walker’s list:  labor and financial market 
institutions, technological and organizational structures, and firm pricing behavior.  (Harris, 1991, 
pp. 90-93; I, 4) 
Finally, we learn from Harris that the Sraffian approach is no less vulnerable to the more 
fundamental charge of path dependence so frequently leveled at the Walrasian models.  In both 
traditions, the realization that disequilibrium trades alter the model’s parameter values  makes “the 
question of convergence to a predetermined equilibrium position necessarily . . . problematical 
unless resort is had to ‘very rigid assumptions.’”  Conversely, any attempt to produce such an 
equilibrium by the introduction of a presumed adjustment process “related to the equilibrium 
position must necessarily rule out features of actual economic behaviour in so far as such 
behaviour entails path dependence.”  All this leads Harris to view the Sraffian equilibrium 
framework with a nihilism not unlike that which characterizes Kaldor’s judgment of the Walrasian 
equilibrium as “a meaningless and contradictory notion.”  For Harris, the problem of path 
dependence “provides general grounds for objecting to the conception of a determinate 
equilibrium of production prices in Classical theory quite apart from any finding of stability or 
instability in the gravitation process,” a conclusion that makes Bharadwaj’s promise of “a much 
more dynamic story” in the Classical tradition appear all the more unreasonably optimistic 
(Harris, 1991, pp. 93-94; I, 4). 
C.  “toys, games of logic” 
Though tiresome in its repetition, no one can deny the validity of the complaint that the 
development of general equilibrium structures in the Walrasian tradition has long since slipped its 17 
moorings to anything remotely approaching the reality we all observe outside the protective walls 
of our seminar rooms.  There can be no surprise, then, that a collection of such work will contain 
abundant examples of Walker’s “toys, games of logic.”  The first three entries in Volume 3 will 
suffice for our purposes.  In the first of these, we find a make-believe economy in which all utility 
functions, endowments, and production processes “fluctuate according to a stationary probability 
law” and, further, every agent “observes the underlying stochastic process which governs all 
exogenous fluctuations in the economy” and presumes the continued operation of that process.  
Combining these principles with a permanent-income characterization of consumption behavior, 
we are led to the less than remarkable conclusion that markets for contingent claims are 
unnecessary in this world.  Consumers provide themselves with all the insurance they require 
through their holdings of money balances, which absorb the stochastically predictable shocks to 
income and endowments; and “forward markets are not needed to coordinate intertemporal supply 
and demand, for agents have rational expectations and full information.”  These results are offered 
as “a limited answer to the question of why we do not in reality observe complete markets for 
contingent claims,” a problem that troubled Arrow (1974) in his presidential address to the 
American Economic Association.  That answer, says our author, “is that self-insurance and 
rational expectations can take care of every day fluctuations” (Bewley, 1981, pp. 266, 267; III, 1).  
The reader can be forgiven the view that this is a very “limited answer” indeed, there being, in this 
paradise, no uncertainty that cannot be reduced to a known probabilistic calculus.  Most will, no 
doubt, find greater promise in a passing comment encountered a few entries later in Grandmont’s 
contribution to the collection:  “one should expect markets for contingent contracts to be 
incomplete in actual economies because it would be too difficult and costly to describe 
exhaustively in advance all possible contingencies of a complex, uncertain environment” 18 
(Grandmont, 1991, p. 4; III, 5).  Indeed, Arrow himself acknowledged that the answer to his 
question is likely to be found in a due regard to the costs involved in the construction and 
enforcement of forward and contingent contracts (Arrow, 1974, pp. 8-10). 
We need have no fear of the unknown in moving from Bewley’s world to that of the next 
entry in the volume.  On the contrary, we find there a world much like that which we left behind.  
Here too all “shocks” follow a known probabilistic pattern (“an exogenous, time-homogeneous 
Markov process”) in which “the current state is a sufficient statistic for the future evolution of 
the system” (Duffie et al., 1994; III, 2).  As we move on to the third entry in the volume, our 
powerful foresight dims somewhat, but it is not lost entirely.  Now we enter a world of 
overlapping generations, in which agents age across two periods (Gottardi, 1996; III, 3).  Their 
tastes and endowments change across those two periods according to an unspecified stochastic 
process, but they are unaffected by the agent’s date of birth and hence are independent of events 
occurring prior to that date.  Although the agents have no information as to the probability 
associated with any particular state of the future, they are aware of all the possibilities.  
Consequently, they incorporate all possible future states in their consumption plans, a problem 
that is held within manageable limits by the assumption that this economy contains only a single 
consumption good, which, further, cannot be transferred across periods.  Indeed, the only 
commodity that can be held across periods is non-interest-bearing, fiat money.  Although 
“young” agents may acquire assets as well as the single consumption good, those assets mature 
when the agents enter their “old” period, paying out in money an amount determined by the state 
of the world that occurs in that period.  The point of this peculiar apparatus is to provide yet 
another means of incorporating positive money holdings into the general equilibrium framework, 
though, as with Bewley, the result here is hardly surprising.  In both cases, the models are 19 
carefully constructed to accord to the monetary asset, and to it alone, a critical function.  In 
Bewley’s case, that function is to absorb the shocks of known stochastic fluctuations in income, 
while for Gottardi’s agents money provides the only available means to transfer wealth across 
periods.   
IV.  History or “Timeless” Equilibrium?   
To say that these, and indeed all work in the Walrasian tradition, describe hypothetical 
economies that bear little resemblance to the world we all encounter outside our classrooms is to 
state the obvious twice over.  It is a commonplace that any effort at analysis must abstract from 
institutional detail to some extent.  What distinguishes the Walrasian tradition is only its conscious 
and unwavering resolve to press that abstraction to the highest possible level.  This was, indeed, 
the very characteristic that was advanced by its proponents as the theory’s greatest strength.  
Recall Debreu’s well-known appeal to an “effort toward rigor [that] substitutes correct reasonings 
and results for incorrect ones” and which “dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis where the 
theory, in the strict sense, is logically entirely disconnected from its interpretations” (Debreu, 
1959, p. x).  What we require is a standard of assessment:  at what point does the gain of 
analytical generality obscure rather than illuminate the world we inhabit?  Walker’s repeated 
lamentations over the lack of institutional detail offer little help on this point.  Indeed, his lists of 
the elements defining a “functioning system” suggest an impossible standard of nearly complete 
institutional content.  Yet, difficult though it may be to meet his standard, Walker nowhere 
questions the fruitfulness of the equilibrium concept itself.  Although the “real economy is always 
in disequilibrium” and “does not adjust with sufficient speed to reach equilibrium before it 
changes,” he nevertheless insists that “those features do not mean that comparative equilibrium 
predictions are not interesting.  We are interested in equilibrium in order to discover the 20 
tendencies of the variables in disequilibrium occasioned by a parametric change.”  Hence, we can 
fruitfully appeal to the notion of equilibrium in our policy discourse as a point of reference from 
which to discern the impact that a proposed change will “have upon the directions in which 
variables tend to move, . . . even if equilibrium is never reached nor closely approached” (Walker, 
1997, p. 128; II, 17) 
A.  “Time’s Arrow” 
However, though obscured by the organizational scheme imposed upon the collection, there 
is lurking throughout these volumes a second line of attack that, though related to Walker’s 
criticism, nevertheless constitutes a more fundamental threat to neo-classical theory since, in this 
alternative view, it is the legitimacy of the equilibrium concept itself that is under assault.  We 
have already encountered the Kaldorian form of this argument in his objection that the existence 
of scale economies reduces the equilibrium concept to a “meaningless and contradictory notion” 
(Kaldor, 1972; I, 7; the argument is repeated in Kaldor 1975; I, 9; and 1979; I, 10; the reader 
might well wonder at the propriety of the decision to include all of these in the collection).  
However, a more general statement of the critique is contained in two essays by Joan Robinson 
(1974; I, 8; and 1977), one of which found its way into our collection, and in the ruminations on 
the matter by Sir John Hicks (1976), which did not. 
The problem can be described as the economist’s confrontation with what physicists have 
long known as “time’s arrow” (Eddington, 1929, pp. 68-9).  The irreversibility of the arrow’s 
flight presents difficulties for our theoretical speculations at both its leading and trailing ends.  
First, as we contemplate the influence of anticipated future outcomes on current market behavior, 
it forces us to follow Hicks in admitting the great divide in the nature and precision of our 
knowledge:  “The knowledge that we have, or can have, of the past is different in kind from what 21 
we can know of the future; for the latter, at best, is no more than a knowledge of probabilities” 
(Hicks, 1976, p. 135).  This presents a troubling inconsistency with our concept of equilibrium, 
where, it is said, no agent faces any inducement to change current production or consumption 
behavior.  If agents are able to make such a determination, then, as Robinson (1974, p. 203) points 
out, “every one knows exactly and in full detail what consequences would follow any action that 
he may take.”  Now, as we have seen in the work of Bewley, Duffie, et. al., and other recent 
laborers in the Walrasian vineyard, it is possible to construct such equilibria so long as we infuse 
our agents with a degree of foresight no less than that described by Hicks’s “best” case—“a 
knowledge of probabilities” of future occurrences.  Further, we find in Bewley’s contribution to 
our collection that even this tamed and house-broken breed of uncertainty is sufficient to 
demonstrate Hicks’s earlier observation that “the holding of liquid reserves . . . is a matter of 
provision against an uncertain future—. . . providing oneself with the ability to take action to meet 
emergencies which may arise in the future and which are such that their particular shape cannot be 
accurately foreseen” (Hicks, 1976, p. 139).  This focus on money’s role as a means of insurance 
made necessary by “our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future” 
is, of course, the answer Keynes himself gave long ago to the question of money-holding.  The 
question arises because “it is a recognized characteristic of money as a store of wealth that it is 
barren; whereas practically every other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit.”  
Why, then, asks Keynes, “should anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of 
wealth?”  (Keynes, 1937, pp. 215-216).  We see now that Gottardi has offered an alternative 
answer:  in a world in which there exists no “other form of storing wealth” across periods, even 
those outside the asylum will hold “barren” money balances to serve that purpose.  22 
Nevertheless, though scholars have been remarkably ingenious in redefining our familiar 
notion of equilibrium to incorporate at least this well-behaved, “stochastically known” form of 
“uncertainty,” this work only seems to have imparted all the more weight to Keynes’s prescient 
warning on the matter:  we deceive ourselves when we presume the “calculus of probability . . . to 
be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as that of certainty itself.”   Our 
world presents us with countless, incalculable uncertainties:  the prospect of war or terrorist 
violence, “or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of 
a new invention.”  Keynes’s admonition is no less apt for our world than for his own:  “About 
these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.  
We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-14).  Here is the particular “reality” whose 
omission from the general equilibrium literature troubles Robinson:    “The assumption of ‘perfect 
foresight’ carries the argument out of this world into a system of mathematical abstraction, which, 
although the symbols may be given economic names, has no point of contact with empirical 
reality” (Robinson, 1977, p. 1322). 
At the trailing end of time’s arrow we are faced with the irreversible influence of the past on 
present behavior.  Again as Robinson reminds us (1974, p. 206; I, 8), the vector of solution values 
to a timeless “system of mathematical abstraction” is of no help in determining how a real economy 
will respond to a change in any of the parameters held within the ceteris paribus impound.  A 
simple change in taste alters the pattern of production; but that, in turn, “must  involve investment 
and dis-investment, at least in work in progress, and windfall losses and gains on stocks that have 
become inappropriate.”  Hence, we cannot judge the character (or, indeed, the existence) of the new 
equilibrium unless we “fill in a whole story about the behaviour of the economy when it is out of 
equilibrium, including the effect of disappointed expectations on the decisions being taken by its 23 
inhabitants.”  Of course, when we do so, we must acknowledge that the nature of the new 
equilibrium depends critically on the nature of the disequilibrium behavior that brought it into 
existence; each equilibrium depends upon the disequilibrium path that leads to it.   
This path-dependency consequence of disequilibrium trading is central to Walker’s critique 
as well.  As we have seen, the treatment of disequilibrium transactions defines his distinction 
between “virtual” and “non-virtual” models, itself an element in his repeated demand that general 
equilibrium models meet his standard of a “functioning system.”  It is the failure of that literature 
to meet that standard that explains its preoccupation with the three classical questions of 
existence, uniqueness and stability, a preoccupation that is the subject of the two chapters of his 
earlier critique included here.  The argument of these chapters is a familiar lament.  Because the 
literature originates in a strictly mathematical perspective, these triune dimensions of the 
equilibrium solution are likewise understood strictly as properties of the equation systems under 
consideration:  “The question of existence is thus a matter of mathematical logic, of the properties 
and interrelations of equations, a question of their solution, separate from the question of 
stability.”  But this separability arises solely from the model’s failure to specify the process by 
which the move between equilibria is accomplished.  In such an “incomplete,” “virtual” model, 
during the equilibrating process there can be no endogenously caused changes in 
the parameters of the model such as preferences, technology, the amount of land 
and the number of workers.  To assume that changes in prices and notional supplies 
and demands do not affect those conditions is itself a supposition about what 
transpires in disequilibrium in the model.  The stocks of capital goods and of 
consumer durables and inventories of nondurables possessed by consumers and 
businesses do not vary because in disequilibrium there are no transactions, no 
production, no consumption . . . .  There are no changes in real wealth during the 
equilibrating process and therefore no wealth-induced changes in supply or demand 
functions.  
 
Like Robinson, Walker calls for the construction of more complete models that “fill in” the 
disequilibrium story.  In such a system, “certain of the parameters of the equations intended to 24 
describe the model would in fact be endogenous variables, changing as the equilibrating process 
unfolds.  There would be outputs and incomes, transactions at non-general-equilibrium prices and 
changes in such matters as the distribution and value of assets.”  Obviously, such a model would 
exhibit the very path dependency that troubled Robinson.  In Walker, that characteristic prompts a 
criticism of the traditional treatment of existence and stability as separable questions, for in a 
properly specified “functioning system,” “the question of ascertaining the existence of equilibrium 
is inextricably linked to the dynamic behaviour of the model” (Walker, 1997, pp. 103-4; 107-8; II, 
5; see also II, 17).   
There is, of course, nothing here that is new or controversial.  Notwithstanding Debreu’s 
famous refusal to consider the problems of stability or uniqueness (see for example Hildenbrand’s 
recollection on this point in his “Introduction” to Debreu, 1983, p. 26), researchers have long 
understood that the proliferation of existence proofs serves only, adopting McCloskey’s (1994, p. 
133) blunt expression, to “show that certain equations describing a certain blackboard economy 
have a solution, but they do not give the actual solution to the blackboard problem, much less to 
an extant economy.”  Indeed, thirty years earlier, Chipman (1965, p. 36; I, 17) in a very useful 
survey that is included in our collection, observed that the “real content of the equilibrium concept 
is to be found not so much in the state itself as in the laws of change which it implies . . . .  
Fruitful analysis of equilibrium therefore requires analysis of stability conditions.”  Nevertheless, 
there is an important difference to be drawn in the way that scholars respond to this common 
insight.  As we have seen, Walker’s call for more fully specified models is not an attack on the 
equilibrium concept itself.  For others, however, Kaldor and Robinson in our collection, for 
example, the admitted problem of path dependence is an insuperable bar to the fruitful application 
of the equilibrium framework.  It is not just the pattern of production and wealth holdings that is 25 
influenced by the presumed disequilibrium transactions, the very nature of society’s technical 
knowledge is the product of that adjustment path.  The channel of influence can operate either 
through Kaldor’s scale economies or through relative price effects on the direction of technical 
change, as Robinson suggests following a long tradition among economic historians.
5  We can, of 
course, work out the solution values for a Walkerian, “virtual” model and determine how those 
values change in response to, say, a change in demand from potatoes to wheat.  But we cannot 
deny the force of Robinson’s objection that “even this is a somewhat idle exercise, for the path an 
economy follows necessarily influences its technology.  An economy that has developed the 
technology for growing potatoes does not have the same spectrum of technical knowledge as one 
which only grows wheat.”  Hence, by Walker’s lights, a model that presumes to trace out the 
change in equilibria must identify not only the disequilibrium changes in production patterns, 
factor supplies, and wealth holdings but must also be able to predict the change in technological 
knowledge.  All this seems an impossible standard, leading Robinson to conclude, “As soon as the 
uncertainty of the expectations that guide economic behaviour is admitted, equilibrium drops out 
of the argument and history takes its place” (Robinson, 1974, pp. 202-204; I, 8)   
We can discern in this collection the whisper of time’s arrow even in our “virtual” models, in 
spite of our best efforts there to avoid its demands.  In support  of the decision to limit his agents 
                                                 
5 The objection raised by Robinson has long been common fare among economic historians—one of those areas of 
our discipline which takes seriously the injunction to take care with the institutional and technical details of the 
economy under consideration.  It was Rosenberg’s study of the history of technological advance that prompted his 
observation that the economist’s common distinction between factor substitution (represented as a simple 
movement along a known isoquant in response to changing factor prices) and technological change (portrayed as a 
shift in the entire production function) is, from the perspective of the agents involved, a distinction without a 
difference.  Since technological knowledge, like all knowledge, can be acquired only through the expenditure of 
scarce resources, we should expect that “the known portion of an isoquant typically [will] be . . . a relatively small 
segment.”  Viewed in this light, the problem presents us with a discomfiting question, which Rosenberg will not 
allow us to avoid:  “If, in response to a change in factor prices, a firm has to commit resources to establishing new 
optimal input mixes, should not the activity leading to the new knowledge be described as technological change 
and not factor substitution? . . . .  Once a substantial research expenditure is required for what is called ‘factor 
substitution,’ what is left of the economic basis for the distinction between technological change and factor 
substitution?”  (Rosenberg, 1975, p. 459, emphasis added.)   
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to a single consumption commodity per period, Gottardi (1996, p. 77; III, 3) observes,  
“Uncertainty in fact destroys the symmetry between past and future and hence the equivalence 
between transfers across generations within the same period and across the different periods of an 
individual’s life.”  Indeed; time’s arrow permits movement in only one direction:  “past and future 
are different” (Hicks, 1976, p. 135).  That irreversibility of time poses a problem for Bewley as 
well, and here too the issue is one that Hicks foresaw.  If Bewley’s consumer is to maximize 
utility subject to a long-run budget constraint, he must know the value of his marginal utility of 
money (λi in Bewley’s notation).  But this requires that the consumer determine his utility across 
all goods and equilibrium prices in the current state.  “However,” says Bewley, this need not 
impose too heavy a burden if we “can think of the consumer as having found the appropriate level 
of λi by trial and error” (Bewley, 1981, p. 276; III, 1).  In other words, as Hicks observed earlier, at 
least when making large and infrequent purchases, the consumer likely does not (as our theory 
supposes) “re-think his whole budget, identifying the collection of goods which would have to be 
given up if [the contemplated purchase were made].”  The decision rests instead on a rough 
estimate of “what one can afford,” and that is indicated by the marginal utility of money.  That 
familiar Marshallian concept “is much more than the mere Lagrange multiplier . . . .  It is the 
means by which the consumer is enabled to make his separate decisions, and to make them fairly 
rationally, without being obliged to take the trouble to weigh all conceivable alternatives.”  But 
we now have another point where the decisions of the past intrude upon our derivation of present 
equilibrium.  If the consumer obtains the estimate of his marginal utility of money by “trial and 
error” over “past experience,” then different pasts will produce different present demand functions 
and thus different present equilibrium vectors (Hicks, 1976, pp. 137-38). 
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B.  Obscured Filiations 
Several years ago, Weintraub pointed out that Hicks’s Value and Capital (1939) advanced 
“two related sets of ideas . . .  concerning equilibrium and stability.”  In the first half of the book 
we find the now familiar, Walrasian question regarding the tendency of a particular equilibrium 
state to be reestablished after a temporary perturbation.  In the second half of the book, where 
Hicks takes up the “foundations of dynamic economics,” the argument turns to the possibility of a 
coherent process of economic evolution across time.  Because of the considerable influence of 
Value and Capital, “we see that from Hicks there was a bifurcation of the dynamics literature into 
two separate lines” concerning, on the one hand, “the stability of a competitive equilibrium” and, 
on the other, “growth dynamics and capital theory” (Weintraub, 1991, p. 36).  Now, it is evident 
that both of these distinct lines of thought are encompassed in Robinson’s objection that economic 
analysis would be better served by a notion of historical evolution rather than by continued appeal 
to a discredited concept of equilibrium.  If we acknowledge that transactions occur at 
“disequilibrium” prices, then what reason have we for our claim that a particular “equilibrium” 
state will be reestablished after a disturbance?  Likewise, if we acknowledge that the present state 
of the world in all its dimensions (the pattern of wealth holdings, the nature and extent of 
available inputs; the nature of the technology, and so on) is the product of actions and decisions 
taken in the past under the influence of (possibly unrealized) expectations held at the time, what 
reason have we to claim that there exists an identifiable, “equilibrium” growth path to which the 
economy will tend in the future, much less that we can actually identify that path?  It is evident 
from the collection before us that these complaints have not fallen on deaf ears.  Though unwilling 
to abandon entirely the equilibrium concept, theorists have sought to modify the analytical content 
of that concept in response to these objections.  Further, though the organizational structure of the 28 
collection does not bring out this point, we can nevertheless discern a pattern of intellectual 
evolution that exhibits the same “bifurcation” in the conceptualization of the equilibrium problem 
that Weintraub found in the earlier developments prompted by Hicks’s Value and Capital.  
We find the second of these themes—that pursuing the economy’s evolution across time—in 
the third of our volumes, where we encounter a recent survey of the “temporary equilibrium” 
research program by Grandmont (1991; III, 5), his earlier (1977), seminal paper laying out that 
agenda having already been included in the Debreu collection.  Dispelling any remaining doubt 
regarding Hicks’s influence on this literature, Grandmont describes in detail his debt to the 
Hicksian analytical “Monday”—that one point in the “week” when the markets are open, 
permitting agents to contract for their planned production and consumption over the remainder of 
the week.  Although “Monday’s” prices are presumed to be determined by the equality of the 
current quantities supplied and demanded, since no further recontracting is permitted—thereby 
maintaining prices unchanged over the remainder of the “week”—the plans and expectations 
formed for the future may well, and indeed will likely, be unsatisfied  (Hicks, 1939, chap. ix; for a 
more recent summary and evaluation, see Hicks, 1976, pp. 141-2).  Hence, the equilibrium 
established on “Monday” is strictly temporary.  The analytical problem then is to trace out “the 
evolution in time of the sequence of temporary equilibria” (Grandmont, 1991, p. 4; III, 5).  
Obviously, that sequence can be specified so as to allow the agents to adjust their plans on the 
basis of new information revealed in each succeeding period, permitting an adaptive learning 
process.  As Punzo (1991, pp. 31-2; III, 6) puts the point in a comment on the Grandmont paper, 
“Given the sequential character of temporary equilibrium analysis, whereby the equilibrium at 
each point of time depends on agents’ beliefs about the values which the relevant variables might 
take in the future, a great deal of work has been devoted to the scrutiny of those assumptions 29 
which reflect the way in which information is processed (learning) and expectations are 
formulated.”  Our collection offers two examples of that work, although the relationship of those 
papers to the temporary equilibrium theme will not be readily apparent since they are not classed 
under that heading (which is limited to the Grandmont and Punzo entries).  Both papers illustrate 
one of the three sets of questions identified by Grandmont as comprising the temporary 
equilibrium research program—namely the question of “the stability of long-run steady-states 
when traders employ given learning procedures.”  The lone entry under the heading of “rational 
expectations” is the Evans and Honkapohja (1994, III, 9) demonstration that the introduction of 
adaptive learning processes in models with multiple such equilibria will not necessarily produce a 
convergence to a unique, stable equilibrium.  The paper is certainly an illustration of a common 
class of rational expectations equilibria, but its chief contribution is its investigation of the effect 
of learning processes on the character of those equilibria, locating it securely within that segment 
of the temporary equilibrium literature that seeks to determine whether the “sequences of 
temporary equilibria do or do not converge to steady states” when the agents are “described as 
learning progressively the dynamics of their environment” (Grandmont, 1991, p. 19; III, 5).  
Likewise, Bullard’s (1994; III, 27) paper, buried near the end of Volume III in the catch-all, 
“other” category, extends the Evans-Honkapohja analysis to the class of overlapping generations 
models and finds that the introduction of a similar learning process can produce a sequence of 
equilibria in which forecasting errors never vanish, raising the possibility of endogenous cycles. 
Ironically, that “other” category at the end of Volume III also contains a key contribution to 
the second leg of that “bifurcated” analytical response to the “timeless” character of Walrasian 
models.  We find there Hahn’s (1978; III, 26) early attempt to incorporate disequilibrium trades in 
a context where agents face quantity constraints in some markets.  This paper would be better 30 
placed as the first item in Volume II, part 3, “models with various forms of market imperfection.”  
As it stands, that section opens with a more recent paper by Dehez and Drèze ([1984] 1991; II, 
22), which is itself simply a variation on the theme considered in the earlier Hahn paper (and 
begun by a yet earlier paper by Drèze, 1975, which is reproduced in the Debreu collection.)  
Indeed, the whole of parts 2 and 3 of Volume II offer a coherent, nearly unbroken sequence of 
work illustrating the evolution of theorists’ attempts to expand the familiar Walrasian framework 
to incorporate disequilibrium trades.  Part 2 (containing just four items) opens with the earliest 
published statement of the so-called Hahn trading process (Hahn and Negishi, 1962; II, 18), 
includes Fisher’s (1976; II, 19) extension to introduce disequilibrium production and consumption 
and ends with two very useful surveys by Fisher (1983, chap. 2; II, 20) and Busetto (1995; II, 21).  
Part 3 (with the addition of the Hahn, 1978, paper “mislaid” to Volume III) carries the sequence 
forward to include illustrations of those efforts to incorporate elements of imperfect competition 
and consequent quantity restraints on the one hand and price rigidities on the other.  The only 
apparent “break” in the thread occurs when we encounter the Mercenier (1995; II, 25) paper, 
which, as we have seen above in note 2, is the collection’s sole illustration of computational 
general equilibrium models.  It is true that his model includes a set of industries exhibiting a 
degree of monopoly power arising from the introduction of scale economies, but the paper differs 
from all others in the sequence (and, indeed, in the entire collection) in that its object is not the 
investigation of the theoretical implications of such a structure but rather to offer a warning to 
practitioners of the dilemma raised for policy evaluation when the parameterization of such 
models produces multiple plausible solutions.
6 
                                                 
6  One further curious classification is worth noting.  Volume III contains a section devoted to “Bayesian” 
equilibrium comprising a single chapter on the subject by Laffont (1991; III, 10).  However, in this context, 
“Bayesian” refers to an equilibrium concept employed in dynamic games in which each player is endowed with a 
subjective probability distribution over the information privately available to the other players.  Hence, this item 31 
C.  Equilibrium as “Process” 
We have here a sample of over a quarter-century of work devoted to the introduction of 
disequilibrium behavior into the general equilibrium framework.  To those who expect their 
economic models to bear some remote connection to the behavior actually observed outside the 
seminar room, these more recent developments will appear, when viewed in contrast to those 
early Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie models, as “a step in the right direction.”  But they are still a very 
long way from Walker’s standard of a “functioning system,” and Walker is not alone in his 
complaint on this point.  Within our collection, Busetto is particularly forthright in his assessment 
of this work:  these disequilibrium models remain “firmly linked to the GE [general equilibrium] 
traditional assumptions, safeguarding the central role of the equilibrium notion and of the 
properties underlying it.  But this involves the impossibility of explaining the observable 
behaviour of the individual agents in disequilibrium and of determining the actual time-path of the 
economies investigated and the particular GE position eventually attained by them.”  The best 
these models can do is to identify the properties that produce convergence to some (variously 
defined) equilibrium position (Busetto, 1995, p. 96; II, 21). 
To some observers, the past quarter-century of labor in these barren fields has only returned 
us full circle to the very complaints raised by Kaldor, Robinson, and Hicks:  we must, they 
conclude, abandon the static notion of equilibrium at the core of the neo-Walrasian research 
program and substitute in its stead a dynamic vision that captures the processes by which agents 
adjust their behavior to changing market forces.  The most provocative statement of this type in 
our collection comes from Blaug and rests on a distinction between “two very different notions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
would be more logically placed in the long section devoted to game theory, perhaps at the end of that section, after 
the Mailath (1998) paper on evolutionary games, since the Bayesian concept can be viewed as an extension of an 
evolutionary game in which the players modify their expectations of their competitors’ future actions on the basis 
of observed current actions. 
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what is meant by competition”:  on the one hand, “competition as an end-state of rest in the 
rivalry between buyers and sellers” and on the other, “competition as a process of rivalry that may 
or may not terminate in an end-state.”  It is the latter of these, Blaug insists, that has the longer 
pedigree; and certainly no on who has read their work would question his observation that the 
Classicals typically employed the “competition” term “with a definite or indefinite article attached 
to it,” writing of “a competition between capitals” and thereby describing “an active process of 
jockeying for advantage, tending towards but never actually culminating in an equilibrium end-
state.”  It is only because of “the invidious legacy of Walras’s influence” that economics has, 
since the 1930s exhibited a regrettable “failure to address questions of active competition and 
instead to fall back uncritically on a model of perfect [end-state] competition as an ‘ideal type.’”  
The work of the general equilibrium theorists over the past quarter-century, in which they have 
sought to expand their models to account for disequilibrium behavior, carries no weight for Blaug.  
On the contrary, he, like Busetto, dismisses that work for its failure to abandon that notion of an 
equilibrium “end-state” that is the chief fault of the Walrasian program: “ this is a curious kind of 
disequilibrium analysis in which there is no process of rivalry between unrepresentative individual 
households and firms, no real contest between economic agents, but rather various end-state 
equilibrium points called disequilibria, the entire exercise differing from standard analysis only in 
that non-clearance of at least one of the subsectors of the economy is possible” (Blaug, 1997, pp. 
241-51; I, 15). 
What then are we to do?  Are we to discard our comfortable legends of perfectly competitive 
end-states of equilibrium?  Yes indeed.  Blaug would take a very broad broom to the discipline 
and sweep away much of our curriculum, leaving only industrial organization (and presumably 
economic history and perhaps history of doctrines): 33 
But what are we then left with?  We are left with the content of every chapter in 
every textbook on imperfect or monopolistic competition, on oligopoly, duopoly 
and monopoly, in short, on industrial organization as a subdiscipline of economics.  
In those chapters, firms jostle for advantage by price and non-price competition, 
undercutting and outbidding rivals in the market-place by advertising outlays and 
promotional expenses, launching new differentiated products, new technical 
processes, new methods of marketing and new organizational forms, and even new 
reward structures for their employees, all for the sake of head-start profits that they 
know will soon be eroded.  In these chapters, there is never any doubt that 
competition is an active process, of discovery, of knowledge formation, of 
‘creative destruction’ [Blaug, 1997, pp. 255-6; I, 15].    
 
In what may be yet another illustration of the principle that new insights in a science appear 
not uniquely, to a single scholar, but rather in “multiples,” independently advanced by several 
investigators, we find, about two hundred pages later in our collection, two remarkable parallels to 
Blaug’s critique, written a decade earlier.  Although his remedy is not so drastic as that proposed 
by Blaug, Jacques Henry (1987, pp. 464-6; I, 26) likewise asks us to relinquish our familiar 
concept of “equilibrium as a state” and to substitute a “notion of process,” defined as “an ordered 
sequence of procedures, decisions or actions . . . motivated by a perceived opportunity or 
advantage . . . [and] that will result in a change in the very conditions that motivated the action in 
the first place.”  Unfortunately, beyond the proposal of a new category of “inequilibrium”—
defined as a “state of affairs in which elements of endogenous change, novelty and permanency 
coexist”—Henry is unable to give operational expression to this “process” approach.  Dore (1984-
85; I, 24), however, independently prompted by like concerns, reminds us that the similar concept 
of “neutral” equilibrium has been employed in certain of the “non-Walrasian” corners of the 
discipline since the early efforts to investigate the conditions giving rise to regular cycles, the 
work on cobweb cycles being an obvious example (see Goodwin, 1947).  The concept conveys 
more than “simply” an expression of an “unstable equilibrium,” as that phrase is understood in a 
Walrasian context; it refers to models that seek to specify the conditions producing the move to 34 
subsequent equilibria and to identify the nature of that dynamic path, as we see, for example, in 
the work on endogenous business cycles.  By now, of course, we have strayed far from our 
Walrasian heritage, but these comments from Henry and Dore together with the similar but more 
vigorous critique from Blaug serve to bring home the realization that the very flaws passed down 
to us by that heritage that so troubled Kaldor and Robinson a quarter-century ago still haunt us 
today. 
V.  Where Do We Stand? 
Although there is room to quibble at the organizing framework employed or at occasional 
omissions from or misclassifications within that framework, Walker has nevertheless performed 
his editorial duties with effect:  he has compiled a collection that offers a commanding view of the 
broad sweep of work in general equilibrium theory.  No one but the most committed enthusiasts 
can come away from this collection without at least a nagging suspicion that the critics are right.  
What is worse, one senses a growing suspicion that a long line of work stretching back more than 
a century has failed to advance our understanding of market outcomes to any significant degree, a 
conclusion that suggests a distressing waste of intellectual resources, just as Kaldor foresaw thirty 
years ago.  Once again Blaug is uncompromising in his judgment:  “after a century or more of 
endless refinements of the central core of GE theory, an exercise which has absorbed some of the 
best brains in twentieth-century economics, the theory is unable to shed any light on how market 
equilibrium is actually attained, not just in a real-world decentralized market economy but even in 
the toy economies beloved of GE theorists.”  To put the point bluntly, “We may conclude that GE 
theory as such is a cul-de-sac: it has no empirical content and never will have empirical content” 
(Blaug, 1997, p. 252; I, 15; see also McCloskey, 1994, p. 135 for a similar claim of resource 
misallocation).  Notice the point of Blaug’s attack:  the theory’s Achilles heel is its inability to 35 
identify that disequilibrium process by which “market equilibrium is actually attained.”  This 
failure comes not for want of trying.  Steven Smale’s work of the 1970s reintroduced his 
“mathematics of time”—differential calculus and global analysis of differential equations—quite 
deliberately to give mathematical expression to the process of disequilibrium adjustment across 
time.
7  However, although Small (1976a) is able to identify functional forms that ensure a globally 
stable process of convergence to equilibrium, no one has been able to invest his differential 
equations with any meaningful economic interpretation.  Hahn’s (1982, p. 767) assessment is 
typical:  “While these results are of interest as algorithms, they have the drawback that it does not 
seem possible to give them an economic motivation.”  It is that “drawback,” in its various guises, 
that has led even some of those who have labored long and tirelessly in the Walrasian fields to 
express agreement with Blaug’s assessment that this line of inquiry has brought us to a “cul-de-
sac.”  In their marvelously rich history of that research program, Ingrao and Israel close their 
survey of the stability literature with the observation that Smale’s new approach to that problem, 
together with the work of those who followed him in that path, has “not only not modified but 
actually confirmed the impression of the existence of a complete impasse in the theory of global 
stability.”  These results, they conclude, “provide conclusive evidence that any attempt to obtain a 
globally defined and globally stable process of price adjustment is doomed to failure.  
                                                 
7  Our collection contains Smale’s (1976b; I, 21) paper in which he offers his justification for returning to the 
calculus techniques earlier displaced by Debreu’s axioms of topology.  The reader will likely agree with Ingrao 
and Israel (1990, p. 353) in their observation that “it is really amusing to see the overturning of values proposed by 
Smale: what was first viewed as a progressive development becomes an obstacle to be swept away.”  It is not quite 
correct to say, as Walker (1997, pp. 96-7; II, 5) seems to suggest, that Smale’s reintroduction of the calculus 
“demonstrated” that the topological framework employed in Arrow’s and Debreu’s work of the 1950s was a 
“methodologically inferior” approach adopted because it was “convenient from a mathematical point of view.”  
While it is true that Smale’s reformulation “recognizes time rates of change,” it is also true that it rests on 
techniques of global analysis that were not widely developed among mathematicians until roughly a decade after 
Arrow and Debreu developed their existence proofs.  See Ingrao and Israel (1990, pp. 305-8) 
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Consequently, research in this direction must be considered as having come to a dead end” 
(Ingrao and Israel, 1990, pp. 358-9; emphasis in original). 
The gravity of this problem for the continued vitality of the general equilibrium research 
program cannot be overstated.  As we are reminded in the opening entry to our collection, Arrow 
and Hahn set as a goal of that program the rigorous formulation of Smith’s invisible hand 
metaphor, which they understand as the “poetic expression” of “the most important intellectual 
contribution that economic thought has made to the general understanding of social processes”—
namely, “the notion that a social system moved by independent actions in pursuit of different 
values is consistent with a final coherent state of balance” (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, p. 1; I, 1).  But 
if this is truly to be our contribution, then it is not enough simply to prove the existence of such a 
state.  Our theory must also explain how the economy actually achieves that position.  The 
memorable statement given the problem by Ingrao and Israel (1990, p. 331) is worth repeating: 
An ideological standpoint that regards the market as possessing the virtue or 
intrinsic property of combining subjective behavior harmoniously cannot content 
itself with simply knowing that a final state of equilibrium exists.  It has to show 
that the economy is capable of attaining this state spontaneously . . . .  Otherwise, 
one would be forced to acknowledge that market forces are not capable of leading 
the market itself to equilibrium and that Smith’s “invisible hand” wavers Sisyphus-
like around the actually existing equilibrium position without having the strength to 
push the economic system into it.  
This inability of the theory to trace out the economy’s movement across time was earlier 
glimpsed in Sonnenschein’s (1972) famous demonstration that the classic, very general conditions 
imposed upon individual utility functions are insufficient to permit the aggregation of those 
functions into uniquely specified market excess demand relationships.  Hence, without additional 
restraints on the structure of the model, one can have no hope of obtaining a unique equilibrium or 
even a set of discrete equilibria.  This result struck at the foundation of the Walrasian program—
namely, “the belief that significant results could be obtained by starting from very general 37 
hypotheses about the behavior of economic agents.  The endeavor to keep the theory at the highest 
level of generality thus proved to be one of its weakest points” (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 316).  
It is ironic, in view of his repeated call for highly specified “functioning systems,’ that Walker 
fails to emphasize the significance of this result and of those elaborations that followed in its 
wake.  On the contrary, Walker (1997, pp. 137-8; II, 17) holds that “the sorrow and pessimism 
over the implications of [Sonnenschein’s] conclusions regarding the impossibility of making 
assumptions about individual demand functions that would restrict the form of aggregate excess 
demand functions are unnecessary.”  It is certainly true that Sonnenschein “analysed only the 
relationship between individual and aggregate excess demand functions” and consequently “did 
not specify or even imply the many structural and behavioural features necessary to create a 
complete model,” but that is precisely the point.  It is Sonnenschein’s result and the later work that 
it prompted that has led Hildenbrand, and others who, like him, have contributed so much to the 
Walrasian tradition, to conclude, however reluctantly, that “an exchange economy can no longer 
serve as an appropriate prototype example for an economy if one wants to go beyond the 
existence and optimality problem.”  This is, as Hildenbrand properly insists, “an extremely 
important insight that must have an impact on future research projects” (“Introduction” to Debreu, 
1983, p. 26)
8.   
                                                 
8  Hildenbrand’s (1994, p. ix) memoir of his own reaction to the Sonnenschein result strikes a poignant chord: 
 
I was deeply consternated.  Up to that time I had the naive illusion that the microeconomic 
foundation of the general equilibrium model, which I admired so much, does not only allow us to 
prove that the model and the concept of equilibrium are logically consistent (existence of equilibria), 
but also allows us to show that the equilibrium is well determined.  This illusion, or should I say 
rather, this hope, was destroyed, once and for all, at least for the traditional model of exchange 
economies. 
I was tempted to repress this insight and to continue to find satisfaction in proving existence of 
equilibria for more general models under still weaker assumptions.  However, I did not succeed in 
repressing the newly gained insight because I believe that a theory of economic equilibrium is 
incomplete if the equilibrium is not well determined. 38 
But what is that impact to be?  Certainly it involves a movement in the very direction that 
Walker has urged.  Hildenbrand (1994) himself has taken a step in that direction with his recent 
effort to draw upon the Family Expenditure Surveys to structure his theory of market demand 
functions.  But this amounts to a renunciation of Debreu’s principle that the theory must be 
pressed to ever higher levels of abstraction, thereby remaining “entirely disconnected from its 
interpretations”—a principle that has guided work in this tradition for the past half-century.  The 
irony in the present state of affairs is nicely stated by Ingrao and Israel in their concluding 
assessment of that tradition:  we are enabled to see so clearly the theory’s flaws precisely because 
of the axiomatic form so strenuously urged by Debreu.  That “axiomatic approach has ‘x-rayed’ 
the state of the theory in a complete and even pitiless way,” revealing an unchanging 
“programmatic core” characterized by the persistent focus on the problems of existence, 
uniqueness, and stability.  But, after a half-century of refinements, we are left with “a 
contradiction between the theory’s aims and the consequences derived from the system of 
hypotheses constituting its structure.”  Most readers will likely find in Walker’s collection ample 
cause to agree with Ingrao and Israel that “the only way out of this situation is to jettison 
explicitly the programmatic central core that has been so carefully preserved.”  What exactly is to 
replace that barren core remains an open question, but it certainly “cannot avoid the highly 
difficult and crucial question of the relations between theory and empirical reality” (Ingrao and 
Israel, 1990, pp. 361-2), a “question” which Hildenbrand has already begun to explore.  In their 
fascinating history of the rise of the “Bourbakist” tradition in mathematics and its apparent 
influence through Debreu on the course of general equilibrium theory, Weintraub and Mirowski 
recall the comment of one of the tradition’s founders, who characterized its product as “a very 39 
well arranged cemetery with a beautiful array of tombstones, . . . useless for teaching” (Wientraub 
and Mirowski, 1994, p. 251).  Is there a more apt epitaph for its economic progeny?   
What then does all this mean for our old friend “equilibrium”?  Must we follow the counsel 
of Kaldor, John Henry, Robinson, Blaug, and others who would have us “jettison” that concept 
along with the extreme abstraction and wholly static axiomatization that has characterized the 
Walrasian tradition?  No, on this our collection suggests a broad consensus: the concept is central 
to our reasoning process and hence cannot be abandoned.  Without it we can have no hope of 
getting beyond description to a level of analysis that can at least aspire to prediction.  As we saw 
at the outset of this essay, that view, though widely represented in our collection, was most 
cogently expressed nearly a half-century ago in Machlup’s reminder that equilibrium is properly 
understood as a “useful fiction” that permits our models to illuminate those causal relationships 
that are the object of our study.  To presume equilibrium at the initial position is a means of 
ensuring that the postulated shock is “the sole disturbing change, the sole cause of anything that 
follows in the model.”  Further, to trace out “the sequence of adjusting changes until we reach a 
situation in which, barring another disturbance from the outside, everything could go on as it is,” 
is simply to complete the argument and thereby assure ourselves “that ‘no further adjustments’ are 
required by the situation” (Machlup [1958] 1991, p. 48; I, 6; emphasis in original).  Of course, our 
theories must contain enough institutional detail that we can discern in them at least a dim 
reflection of the world in which we live; and Walker’s precept of a complete, “functioning 
system” is, no doubt, a laudable goal.  But the unqualified demands with which he invests that 
principle prompt the same response as that which Hicks gave to a like charge from a critic of his 
time:  “His ideal economics is not so far away from my own ideal economics; but I regard it as a 40 
target set up in heaven.  We cannot hope to reach it; we must just get as near to it as we can” 
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